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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court in Socidt6
Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District
Court' considered whether U.S. courts should apply the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters,2 rather than the discovery provisions
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author wishes to thank Professors A. Leo Levin, Stephen B. Burbank, and
Peter Winship for their valuable suggestions on earlier drafts of this
Comment. All errors are of course mine. The author also wishes to
gratefully acknowledge receipt of the 1992 Samuel F. Pryor III, Esq. Prize.
Mr. Pryor has been a long-time supporter of the Journal of International
Business Law. It is an honor to receive this award bearing his name.
1 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
2 The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781
(West Supp. 1992) [hereinafter "Evidence Convention" or "Convention"].
The Convention was ratified by the United States Senate on June 13, 1972.
See 118 CONG. REC. 20,623 (1973).
The Convention's principal method for obtaining evidence is the "Letter
of Request." See Convention, art. 1. The Convention also permits the
taking of evidence by commissioners or consular agents. See Convention,
art. 15. For discussion of the Convention and its procedures, see infra notes
78-95 and accompanying text.
The following twenty-one nations have entered into the Convention:
Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1992).
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' when discovery is
sought from a party subject to a U.S. court's jurisdiction and
needed evidence, though located abroad, will be produced in
the United States.4 Academic commentary on the subject at
the time often reflected the belief that the Convention provided
the exclusive' or mandatory6 means of obtaining evidence
" Methods of obtaining evidence under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure [hereinafter "Federal Rules" or "Rules"] include FED. R. CIV. P.
30 (Depositions Upon Oral Examination); FED. R. CIV. P. 31 (Depositions
Upon Written Questions); FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (Interrogatories to Parties);
FED. R. CIrv. P. 34 (Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon
Land for Inspection and Other Purposes); FED. R. CIv. P. 35 (Physical and
Mental Examination of Persons); and FED. R. Civ. P. 36 (Requests for
Admissions).
" The Arospatiale Court did not address whether litigants would be
required to take evidence under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
Hague Evidence Convention when the needed evidence will be taken in, as
opposed to from, a signatory nation. See GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY
& MATERIALS 329 (1989) (noting that although "[t]heA6rospatiale Court left
[this] question open [, m]ost authorities have concluded that the Convention
must be used when the physical act of discovery occurs abroad"). For an
example of a lower court decision reaching precisely this conclusion, see
Jenco v. Martech Intl, Inc. 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4727 (E.D. La. May 19,
1988) (Convention used for depositions taken in Norway). When evidence
is sought from foreign non-parties, lower courts have required that discovery
proceed under the Convention. See, e.g., Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121
F.R.D. 254, 257 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
' See Comment, TheHague Convention on the Taking ofEvidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures
for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1984) (contending that
because "the Convention takes precedence over federal and state rules of
civil procedure, American courts may only order discovery pursuant to the
terms of the Hague Evidence Convention").
Several Evidence Convention signatory nations took a similar position
in the A6rospatiale case. See, e.g., A6rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 529 n.11
(quoting Brief for Republic of France asAmicus Curiae at 4) ("THE HAGUE
CONVENTION IS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS OF DISCOVERY IN
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AMONG THE CONVENTION'S SIGNA-
TORIES UNLESS THE SOVEREIGN ON WHOSE TERRITORY DISCOV-
ERY IS TO OCCUR CHOOSES OTHERWISE."). Use of the word "unless"
in France's amicus brief refers to Article 27 of the Convention. For a
discussion of Article 27, see infra notes 104-05, 119-121 and accompanying
text.
' See, e.g., Martin Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: Several Notes Concerning Its Scope,
Methods and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031, 1058 (1984)
(contending that "the Convention is the supreme law of the land and as such
is not optional"); Patricia A. Kuhn, Comment, Soci6tg Nationale Industrielle
A6rospatiale: The Supreme Court's Misguided Approach to the Hague
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located vAthin the territory of another signatory nation. U.S.
courts, however, often differed 7 regarding the Convention's
proper role in civil and commercial litigation in the United
States.8
Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1064 (1989) (arguing that the
Convention "provides mandatory procedures for obtaining evidence abroad").
' Several lower federal courts had held that litigants should be required
to pursue discovery under the Evidence Convention before doing so under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., General Electric v. North
Star Int'l, Inc., No. 83-C-0838 (N.D. III. Feb. 21, 1984); Laker Airways Ltd.
v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984); Philadelphia
Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 83-C-1928 (N.D. ll. Sept. 15,
1983). However, other lower federal courts beld that the choice between
applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Evidence Convention
should be decided by balancing competing sovereign interests. See, e.g.,
Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984);
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. fI. 1984); Lasky v.
Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
At the appellate level, at least one court recognized the difficulty of
balancing competing sovereign interests. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena
Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). However, the
emerging trend in the appellate courts had been to hold the Evidence
Convention inapplicable when a party from whom evidence is sought is
subject to a U.S. court's jurisdiction and needed evidence, though located
abroad, will be produced in the United States. See, e.g., Daimler-Benz
Aktiengesellschaft v. United States District Court, 805 F.2d 340 (10th Cir.
1986); Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District
Court, 788 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated as settled, 823 F.2d 382 (9th
Cir. 1987); Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States
District Court, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 522 (1987);
In re Anschuetz & Co. GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated and
remanded for further consideration, 483 U.S. 1002 (1987); In re Messer-
schmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985).
Conversely, state courts almost uniformly required first resort to the
Convention. See, e.g., Pierberg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.
App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Vincent
v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984);
Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Gebr.
Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d
492 (W. Va. 1985).
" Confusion about the Hague Evidence Convention's proper role in U.S.
civil and commercial litigation is not surprising. The Convention is a treaty,
see Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 323 (1973), and thus, under the Supremacy
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Adrospatiale was an action for damages based on negli-
gence, breach of warranty, and products liability9 resulting
from the crash of a French manufactured airplane in Iowa, in
which the pilot and a passenger were injured.1 ° Upon the
parties' consent, the District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa consolidated the actions and referred the case to a
Magistrate." Petitioners, two French corporations, 12 re-
sponded to plaintiffs' first discovery request,' which sought
admissions and production of documents located in the United
States, and also made discovery requests of their own under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 However, when
plaintiffs served petitioners with a second discovery request,
this time seeking admissions, answers to interrogatories, and
production of documents located in France, petitioners filed a
Clause, is "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like the Convention, also
have the force of federal law. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1988). When two federal laws conflict, the "last in time" rule normally
determines which law is paramount. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 4, at
14. Under the "last in time" rule, "a treaty supersedes prior federal
statutes." Id. at 14. The United States acceded to the Convention in 1972,
long after enactment of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1934. However, the U.S. Supreme Court approved an amendment to Rule
26 in 1983. Although the amended rule should supersede the Convention
under the "last in time" rule, "the Supreme Court has held that 'a treaty
will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a latter statute
unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.'"
Comment, supra note 5, at 1484 (citation omitted). Congress, however, did
not indicate whether the amended Rule 26 was to supersede the Convention.
Whether the Hague Evidence Convention supersedes the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is further complicated by the ambiguous nature of the
Convention. The Convention is unclear about whether it is exclusive,
mandatory, or optional; whether it applies to parties and to non-parties; and
whether it is applicable when evidence is to be taken from, as opposed to in,
a signatory nation. See generally Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules
and The Hague Conventions: Concerns of Conformity and Comity, 50 U.
PITr. L. REV. 903 (1989).
'Brief for Respondent, No. 85-1695.
Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 525.
SId.
1 Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale is a corporation owned by
the French government. Soci6t6 de Construction d'Avions de Tourisme is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale. Id.
at n.2.
13 See Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 525 n.4.
1 Id. Petitioners deposed witnesses and parties, served interrogatories,
and requested documents.
[Vol. 13:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss3/3
FIVE YEARS AFTER AtROSPATIALE
motion for a protective order, contending that requests for
evidence located within French territory must be made in
accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention.15 Petition-
ers further asserted that responding to plaintiffs' request
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would subject them
to fines under French penal law.'"
After the Magistrate denied the motion for a protective
order and ordered petitioners to comply with the discovery re-
quests, 17 petitioners sought a writ of mandamus from the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit." The Court of
Appeals held that the Evidence Convention is inapplicable
when a U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over a party from
whom discovery is sought and needed evidence, though located
abroad, will be produced in the United States. The Court of
Appeals also denied petitioners' application for a writ of
mandamus against the Magistrate." Petitioners then
appealed to the Supreme Court.
15 Id.
, The French statute provides in pertinent part:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws
and regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or
disclose, in writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial,
industrial, financial or technical documents or information leading
to the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or
administrative proceedings or in connection therewith.
Id. at 526 n.6 (quoting French Penal Code Law No. 80-538, art. 1A).
The French "blocking statute," which provides for fines for its violation,
was enacted because the French government was "[a]ngered by the fact that
'the terms of the Hague [Evidence] Convention ... were frequently
disregarded by American litigants .... '" Comment, supra note 5, at 1481
(quoting Brigitte E. Herzog, The 1980 French Law on Documents and
Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382, 382 (1981)).
1 See Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 526-27. The Magistrate "balanced the
interests in the 'protection of United States citizens from harmful foreign
products and compensation for injuries caused by such products' against
France's interest in protecting its citizens 'from intrusive foreign discovery
procedures' [and] concluded that the former interests were stronger,
particularly because compliance with the requested discovery will 'not have
to take place in France' and will not be greatly intrusive or abusive." Id. at
527 (citations omitted).
Id.
' See In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120,
124 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A.6rospatiale v.
United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
1992]
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Despite a 5-4 decision,2" the Adrospatiale Court unani-
mously agreed that the Hague Evidence Convention does not
provide the exclusive or mandatory means of taking evidence
located abroad. However, as reflected by the 5-4 vote, the
Justices differed regarding when the Convention should be
applied. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that
the Convention "appl[ies] to the production of evidence in a
litigant's possession in the sense that it is one method of
seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ." 1 Accord-
ingly, Justice Stevens instructed lower courts faced with
foreign discovery requests2 to conduct a "particularized"2
comity analysis2 on a case-by-case basis to determine wheth-
er resort to the Convention is appropriate.2 In a separate
opinion,26 Justice Blackmun, concerned that the majority's
approach would too frequently result in use of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the Convention, recom-
mended a presumptive "first resort"27 rule requiring courts to
employ the Convention unless its procedures would clearly fail
, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia. Justice
Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined.
A&ospatiale, 482 U.S. at 541.
"This Comment employs the terms "foreign discovery requests" and
"foreign evidence" to refer to evidence sought from, or located in, a signatory
nation.
-s Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543.
14 For descriptions of comity and a discussion of the factors the
Adrospatiale majority suggested should be used in conducting a comity
analysis, see infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
2" The Court also noted that the existence of a foreign blocking statute
does not, by itself, preclude discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29. Indeed, U.S. courts have
long held that they have the power to order production of evidence located
abroad, despite the existence of such statutes. See Societe Internationale
Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 204-05 (1958).
For discussion of the A~rospatiale majority opinion, see infra notes 98-
111, 115-39 and accompanying text.
"Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 549. For discussion of the Agrospatiale
minority opinion, see infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
27 Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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to produce the needed evidence."8
In the five years since Adrospatiale, scholars, 9 student
commentators,. and practitioners"' have questioned the
reasoning and result of the majority opinion. As some have
noted, the Supreme Court's failure to give the Evidence
Convention greater effect in U.S. litigation raises serious
questions about the United States' respect for foreign judicial
sovereignty, 2 its interest in improving international judicial
" On remand, the District Court required the plaintiffs to conduct
discovery under the Convention. However, the District Court set a limit on
the amount of time petitioners and French authorities would have to comply
with plaintiffs' discovery request. The needed evidence was produced within
this allotted time period. See Lawrence N. Minch, U.S. Obligations Under
the Hague Evidence Convention: More Than Mere Good Will?, 22 INTL LAW.
511, 527 n.68 (1988).
1 See, e.g., Edwin R. Alley & Darrell Prescott, Recent Developments in
the United States Under the Hague Evidence Convention, 2 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 19, 34 (1989) (expressing the "hopeD that the Agrospatiale decision will
not tend to erode existing cooperative relationships"); George A. Bermann,
The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme Court: A Critique of the
Mrospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525, 526 (1989) (describing the
Arospatiale Court's decision as "a disappointment"); Weis, supra note 8, at
928 (contending that "[tihe current state of the law in the courts of this
country [after the Agrospatiale decision] is not satisfactory").
s' See Owen P. Martikan, Note, The Boundaries of the Hague Evidence
Convention: Lower Court Interest Balancing After the Agrospatiale Decision,
68 TEx. L. REV. 1003, 1030 (1990) (suggesting that because "[tihe Hague
[Evidence] Convention provides a mechanism for reconciling competing
policy interests.... courts [should only in certain circumstances] discard
the Convention in favor of... domestic discovery rules"); Diana L. Muse,
Note, Discovery in France and the Hague Evidence Convention: The Search
for a French Connection, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1989) (advocating
first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention); Kuhn, supra note 6, at 1064
(1989) (arguing that the Convention and contemporaneous documents
"strongly support the view that the Supreme Court incorrectly decided the
Mrospatiale case").
"' See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 4, at 331 (describing the Arospatiale
majority opinion as"loosely-reasoned"); Joseph P. Griffin & Mark N. Bravin,
Beyond Agrospatiale: A Commentary on Foreign Discovery Provisions of the
Restatement (Third) and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 25 INT'L LAW. 331 (1991) (contending that "[tlhe majority
opinion.., creates an undesirable and unworkable framework" for taking
evidence located in signatory nations); see Minch, supra note 28, at 527
(concluding that "increased friction with our principal European trading
partners over U.S. demands for documents and information located abroad
appears inevitable" as a result of the Adrospatiale decision).
"2 See, e.g., Weis, supra note 8, at 930 (contending that "[tihe casual
American approach to what [other] countries regard as essential attributes
of [their judicial] sovereignty does little to inspire confidence by those
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cooperation, 3 and its willingness to honor treaty obliga-
tions. 4
The general discovery provision of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 5 has never specifically addressed the taking
of evidence abroad."' However, soon after Adrospatiale, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began considering whether
to amend the general discovery provision to provide U.S.
courts with guidance in this area. As a result of these
deliberations, an amendment to Rule 26(a) largely adopting
the "first resort" approach proposed by Justice Blackmun in
his concurring and dissenting opinion inAdrospatiale was pub-
lished for public comment.3 7 The amendment was later
revised to provide that "discovery shall be conducted by
methods authorized by the [Evidence Convention] unless the
court determines that those methods are inadequate or
inequitable and authorizes other discovery methods not
prohibited by the [Convention].""'
[other] countries in American courts").
ss See Letter from Edwin R. Alley, Esq., Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey
to Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr. 11, 1990) (noting that at
least one nation contemplated acceding to the Evidence Convention before
deciding otherwise because it viewed the Court's A~rospatiale decision "as
a message that the U.S. does not take its treaty obligations seriously").
" See id.
3 5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
"6 Most relevant to the issue in Arospatiale, Rule 26(a) provides no
guidance on how U.S. courts should respond when confronted with requests
to take evidence from, or in, nations whose governments have signed a
treaty with the United States governing such matters. See, e.g., Weis, supra
note 8, at 930 (noting the "silenc;" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding the Hague Evidence Convention).
" See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237, 318 (1989)
[hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. This amendment was published and
released for public comment in the fall of 1989. However, the amendment
was later withdrawn. See Gary Born, Fishing for Trouble In Foreign
Depths, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1991, at 29. The amendment is set forth infra
note 145.
" Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 525, 641 (1991) [hereinafter Proposed
Amendments]. The Advisory Committee forwarded the proposed amendment
to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure with the
recommendation that it be promulgated by the United States Supreme
I[Vol. 13:3
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This Comment examines the Adrospatiale decision and
considers whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
be amended to provide the Hague Evidence Convention with
a greater role in U.S. civil and commercial litigation. Section
2 of this Comment provides background information for
reconsidering the role of the Convention by briefly comparing
evidence gathering techniques employed in the United States
with techniques employed in civil law countries, such as
Germany, 9 so as to underscore the firmly entrenched institu-
tional differences that the Evidence Convention attempts to
bridge.40 Section 2 will also describe the Letter of Request,
the principal method of taking evidence abroad both before
and in the absence of the Hague Evidence Convention. Section
2 will then review events prior to the adoption of the Conven-
tion, consider the Convention's scope,41 and review the
Court. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. However, the proposed
amendment was ultimately returned to the Advisory Committee for further
study. Telephone Interview with Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Secretary,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States (Dec. 31, 1991). The amendment is set forth in the text
accompanying infra note 169.
" It should be noted that there are also significant differences between
evidence gathering procedures employed in the United States and proce-
dures employed in other common law countries. However, because the
Evidence Convention was principally designed to bridge the gap between
civil and common law practices of taking evidence, this Comment does not
discuss procedures employed in other common law nations. For a discussion
of taking evidence in other common law countries, see Lawrence Collins,
Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in England for Use
in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27 (1979). For an account
of one U.S. practitioner's experience taking evidence in England under the
Hague Evidence Convention, see Charles Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad
for Use in Civil Cases in the United States-A Practical Guide, 16 INT'L
LAW. 575 (1982).
"' The differences between common and civil lawlegal systems have been
the subject of considerable commentary. See, e.g., Jacques Borel & Stephen
M. Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France
for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35 (1979)
(discussing French procedure); Axel Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the
Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 231 (1986)
(examining German civil procedure); Platto, supra note 39 (same); John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in CivilProcedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823
(1985) (same); Donald R. Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal
Republic of Germany: The Impact of The Hague Evidence Convention on
German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465 (1983).
41 The exact scope of the Hague Evidence Convention has been the
subject of substantial debate. See infra note 78.
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Convention's procedures for taking evidence located in other
signatory nations.
Section 3 of this Comment will examine the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale
v. United States District Court, which held that the Hague
Evidence Convention is not the exclusive or mandatory means
of obtaining evidence located abroad. Section 4 will examine
recent efforts of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to
amend Rule 26(a) to address the role of the Convention and
other international agreements in U.S. courts. This Comment
in conclusion proposes modifications to Justice Blackmiun's
"first resort" rule and suggests that incorporating such an
approach into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would serve
the interests of the United States in its relations with present
and potential signatory nations, while still protecting litigants
proceeding with discovery under the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion from unfair disadvantage and unreasonable cost or delay.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Taking Evidence in the United States
Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
conducted by the parties prior to trial 2 and is intended to
occur with relatively limited judicial supervision.' The scope
of permissible discovery is quite broad." Parties may obtain
information that will be admissible as evidence at trial and
even inadmissible information, provided that such information
"appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." 5 Permitting such extensive pre-trial
discovery provides the parties with "[m]utual knowledge of all
the relevant facts gathered by both parties and is essential to
4
2 See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (1985).
43 See, e.g., 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2001-08 (1970 & 1988 Supp.).
"See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter.").
45 Id.
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proper litigation." If the parties are fully informed of all
relevant facts, there is a greater likelihood, at least in theory,
that the matter will be settled by the parties before trial.
Alternatively, when a case goes to trial, broad discovery may
ensure a more effective and just resolution of the litigation
than if relevant evidence first comes to the attention of a party
at trial. Failure to respond to discovery requests can result in
sanctions, which may include a default judgment against the
disobedient party.4
Despite its lofty goals, the extensive scope of U.S. discovery
has often been criticized as overly "costly, time-consuming, and
wasteful."" As some commentators have noted, the scope of
discovery is almost so broad as to allow "fishing expedi-
tions"' because parties may, in some cases, attempt to use
discovery to determine whether a claim can successfully be
brought against an opponent. Moreover, the broad scope of
discovery also renders U.S. evidence taking procedures
susceptible to other forms of abuse, such as when a party
serves an opponent with a large number of discovery requests
in an attempt to force the opponent into prematurely settling
or abandoning a claim because of the time and expense
involved in responding to the requests. 0
2.2. Taking Evidence in Civil Law Countries
Unlike the United States, civil law countries do not have
"' Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (sanctions may be imposed upon a party failing
to respond to discovery requests). In the case of a foreign party subject to
the jurisdiction of a U.S. court, a default judgment may be entered and
property seized to satisfy the judgment. If property is not available in the
United States, the plaintiff can seek to have the judgment enforced abroad.
Where evidence is sought from a nonparty, however, sanctions may not be
imposed. It is in these circumstances that the Convention's Letter of
Request procedure may be most helpful because a party can request that a
signatory nation provide compulsion to obtaih the needed evidence from a
nonparty. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 10.
48 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 42, § 7.18, at 421.
4, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 507 (noting that "he... cry of 'fishing
expedition' [cannot] preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underly-
ing [an] opponent's case").
6' See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 42, § 7.18, at 420-21.
1992]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
. U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
pre-trial discovery,5 ' juries, nor even U.S.-style trials.5 2
Moreover, the judge in civil law countries plays a somewhat
different role in civil and commercial matters than her U.S.
counterpart."3 In particular, unlike a U.S. judge, who may
have little if any part in the process of gathering evidence,
judges in civil law countries generally have exclusive control
over the taking of evidence.54
The central role of civil law judges in evidence gathering
reflects three fundamental concerns of civil law nations. First,
civil law countries place great importance on protecting the
privacy of parties and non-parties to litigation.55 Second,
there is a tradition in civil law countries of largely using an
"inquisitorial"" system, under which the judge, not the
representatives of the parties, generally questions witnesses"
and determines whether additional evidence is necessary to
properly decide the case.5" Third, there is a belief, illustrated
by German law, that a party should not be required to assist
an opponent in building his or her case.59 Thus, when a
51 See, e.g., Lawrence Collins, The Hague Evidence Convention and
Discovery: A Serious Misunderstanding?, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 765, 768
(1986) (noting that "[iun civil law countries there is nothing equivalent to
[U.S. pre-trial] discovery").
5' See Langbein, supra note 40; Heck, supra note 40, at 240. Another
significant distinction between the German and American legal systems is
that, in Germany, "the losing party... bear[s] court costs and reimburse[s]
its opponent's attorneys' fees." Id. at 240 n.49 (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 40, at 826-27 (discussing the role of the
judge in German civil and commercial litigation).
5 Id
"See Heck, supra note 40, at 241 n.52 (citation omitted).
5 See Langbein, supra note 40, at 247.
7 See Heck, supra note 40, at 243. Additionally, the testimony of
witnesses is not transcribed by a reporter, as normally occurs in a U.S.
court. Instead, the record contains the judge's summarization of the
witness's testimony. See Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State
William P. Rogers to President Nixon (Nov. 9, 1971), S. ExEc. Doc. A, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1, 1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 324 (1973) [hereinafter
Letter of Submittal] (stating that "the civil law technique results normally
in a resume of the evidence, prepared by the executing judge and signed by
the witness, while the common law technique results normally in a verbatim
transcript of the witness's testimony certified by the reporter").
58 See Heck, supra note 40, at 242.
"Under German law, "a party is not required to help its opponent to
victory by making available material that [the opponent] does not have at
its disposal." See Heck, supra note 40, at 240 (citation omitted). While
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foreign court or litigant attempts to collect evidence from an
opponent in a civil law nation, the role of the civil law judge is
often thought to have been usurped.
2.3. Customary Methods of Taking Evidence Abroad
The principal customary method of taking evidence located
abroad is the Letter Rogatory. 0 A Letter Rogatory is "a
formal request by the court of one nation to the courts of
another country for assistance in performing judicial acts,
[including the taking of evidence]."61 In addition to the fact
that the Letter Rogatory is unlikely to offend the judicial
sovereignty of a foreign nation," the letter is often the only
means of obtaining evidence from an uncooperative witness."
The Letter Rogatory also provides a method of taking evidence
from a witness who is unable to appear at trial in the United
States.64
The Letter Rogatory, while sometimes helpful, is often
time-consuming and expensive. 5 Moreover, there is often no
guarantee that the foreign country in which the required
evidence is located will honor the letter by providing the
requested evidence. 6 The existence of these flaws and the
increase in the amount of international litigation motivated
German courts may require production of additional evidence from the
parties, cases are decided, unless the judge decides otherwise, based solely
on the facts and evidence the parties have in their possession and present
to the court on their own. Id. at 242.
" This Comment focuses on the Letter Rogatory and its Hague Evidence
Convention analog, the Letter of Request. Other methods of obtaining
evidence are not discussed.
,1 BORN & WESTIN, supra note 4, at 306.
o2 Id.
" Id. Under Article 10, the receiving state is required to apply
compulsion to obtain needed evidence, provided such compulsion is
permitted under the receiving state's internal law. See EXPLANATORY
REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL
OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, reproduced from S. EXEC. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (Feb. 1, 1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 334 (1973) [hereinafter
EXPLANATORY REPORT].
4 Id.
'6 Id. at 307.
"Id. at 306-07. There is no obligation to respond to a Letter Rogatory.
Some countries may honor the request in full, while other countries may
only honor the request in part, or not at all.
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the United States to recommend that the Hague Conference on
Private International Law promulgate a treaty to improve
international judicial cooperation in taking evidence abroad.87
2.4. The Hague Evidence Convention
2.4.1. Background
The First Conference at the Hague on Private International
Law to address problems associated with international
litigation was held in 1893."8 However, it was not until 1964
that the United States participated in the Conference for the
first time."9 In that same year, the United States enacted
legislation permitting foreign nations and their citizens to
serve papers and take testimony in this country without first
obtaining permission from the U.S. government. °
The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,"1 which was drafted
at the 1970 Hague Conference, is intended to "facilitate"7 the
taking of evidence abroad by bridging the gap between civil
law and common law practices."' By facilitating the trans-
" See Philip W. Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J. 651 (1969) (noting that the "increase in
international litigation [involving U.S. citizens and corporations created] the
need for an effective international agreement").
68 See Letter of Submittal, supra note 57, at 324.
6 The 1964 Hague Conference resulted in the Hague Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Service Convention]. The
United States entered into the Service Convention on Feb. 10, 1969. See 1
BRUNO RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIvIL AND COMMER-
CIAL) §§ 1-2 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
70 See Amram, supra note 67, at 651.
71 See Convention, supra note 2.
71 See Convention, supra note 2, pmbl. ("The States signatory to the
present Convention, Desiring to facilitate the transmission and execution of
Letters of Request and to further the accommodation of the different
methods which they use for this purpose, Desiring to improve mutual
judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters, Have resolved to
conclude a Convention to this effect.").
" See Letter of Submittal, supra note 57, at 324 (noting that the Hague
Evidence Convention is designed to "bridge differences between the common
law and civil law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad").
The 1970 Convention was"arevision of... the 1954 Convention dealing
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mission of evidence that will be "utilizable"" in the request-
ing country, but which is not procured by methods which will
offend the 'judicial sovereignty" of civil law nations,75 the
Convention manages to exhibit great respect for both common
and civil law traditions. Indeed, according a member of the
United States delegation to the Hague Conference, the
Evidence Convention "fully respects the judicial sovereignty"
of civil law nations7 while providing a "great boon to United
States courts and litigants"."
2.4.2. Taking Evidence Under the Hague Convention
The Hague Evidence Convention provides a method for
parties to obtain evidence78 located within another signatory
with the taking of evidence abroad." Amram, supra note 67, at 652.
"' See Amram, supra note 67, at 652.
" Id. The Hague Evidence Convention "establish[ed] a system for
obtaining evidence located abroad that would be 'tolerable' to the state
executing the request and would produce evidence 'utilizable' in the
requesting state." This system ensures that "[civil law countries'] concepts
of 'judicial sovereignty' are fully respected." Id. at 655.
7, Id at 655.
7 Id at 652.
71 Whether the term 'evidence' as used in the Convention was intended
to encompass pre-trial discovery has been the subject of some dispute. See
Collins, supra note 51 (contending that the Evidence Convention is not
intended to apply to pre-trial discovery). But see Heck, supra note 40, at
235 (stating that "the Convention ... contemplates the use of U.S.-style
[pre-trial] discovery") (citations omitted).
At first glance, Heck seems to have the better of this argument because
Collins's position appears to be negated by the language of the Convention
itself (judicial proceedings "commenced or contemplated") and the ability of
foreign countries to limit pre-trial discovery of documents under Article 23.
Indeed, Collins's reading of the Convention was also implicitly rejected by
the Agrospatiale Court.
However, Collins's argument may have some merit. The language in
the Convention providing that letters of request must relate to "proceedings,
commenced or contemplated" was "designed specifically to authorize the use
of a letter for the purpose of 'perpetuation of testimony' of an aged, dying or
departing witness." See Amram, supra note 67, at 653. Furthermore, the
Convention could not have had as its main purpose the goal of providing for
pre-trial discovery of documents because signatory nations may limit such
requests under Article. 23. Moreover, Philip W. Amram, a member of the
United States delegation, whose interpretation of the convention should be
given great weight, has indicated that the Convention "give[s] United States
courts... an international agreement for the taking of testimony...." See
Amram, supra note 67, at 655 (emphasis added). Because testimony is used
at trial, and document discovery can be limited by signatory nations
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nation for use in preparing and conducting "civil or commer-
cial"79 litigation. Under the Convention, a judicial authority
in a contracting state "may" 0 seek evidence by forwarding a
Letter of Request s' to the "Central Authority" 2 in the signa-
tory nation in which the needed evidence is located. If
requested, the receiving nation is generally required to collect
the evidence using a "special method or procedure""' specified
by the requesting state. Once the evidence is collected, it is
then provided to the requesting state for use in the judicial
proceeding.
The Convention provides that a Letter of Request "shall be
executed expeditiously"" and requires the receiving nation to
comply with the request for evidence. There are, however, two
situations in which receiving nations are not required by the
Convention to honor requests for evidence: (1) when a request
for a "special method or procedure" is "incompatible"" with
pursuant to Article 23, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the Conven-
tion was designed only to apply to "evidence" needed for trial.
This Comment assumes that the Hague Evidence Convention was
intended to apply to both the acquisition of information for pre-trial
discovery and the taking of evidence for trial.
" The Convention applies only to "civil or commercial" matters.
However, the drafters expressly declined to define the meaning of "civil" or
"commercial," instead preferring that any disputes over these terms be
resolved by diplomatic efforts. Nevertheless, the meaning of these terms
has been the subject of litigation. See, e.g., In re State of Norway, 2 W.L.R.
458, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 693 (1989) (considering whether a proceeding to
collect taxes from the estate of a Norwegian shipowner is a "civil" or
"commercial" matter within the meaning of the Convention).
", Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. The Arospatiale Court noted that
the use of the word "may" in Article 1, and the permissive language of the
preamble, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text, are evidence of the
Convention's permissive nature.
81 d. Although this Comment treats the Letter of Request as the
principal means of obtaining evidence under the Convention, the Convention
also provides for taking evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents, and
commissioners. For a detailed explanation of the Convention's procedures,
including obtaining evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents, and
commissioners, see Darrell Prescott & Edwin R. Alley, Effective Evidence-
Taking Under the Hague Convention, 22 INT'L LAW. 939 (1988).
" Convention, supra note 2, art. 2. Every signatory nation must
designate a "Central Authority" to receive and process letters of request.
8 Convention, supra note 2, art. 9.
84 1d
8 Id.; see also Amram, supra note 67, at 654 (" '[I]ncompatible' does not
mean 'different' or 'strange' or 'unfamiliar.' It means that the 'law' of the
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the receiving nation's law;"6 or (2) when a request is "impossi-
ble""' to execute. In addition, a nation may make a declara-
tion under Article 23 of the Convention "that it will not
execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining
pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
countries." 8
Because foreign nations and their citizens have often
resisted U.S. efforts to discover documents, 8 it is not surpris-
ing that many nations have registered Article 23 declarations
to at least partly limit discovery in this area.9 ° The aversion
some nations have to providing documents may be based
largely on privacy concerns 91 or the belief that a party should
not assist an adversary in building its case. 2 However, some
Article 23 reservations may also be attributable to a "gross
misunderstanding" among representatives to the Conven-
tion. Evidently, some representatives incorrectly believed that
U.S. courts would seek discovery of documents on behalf of
potential litigants before litigation is initiated." This mis-
perception has apparently been corrected, however, and as a
result, several nations have modified their original Article 23
state of execution interposes a barrier-some constitutional or statutory
inhibition.").
" Requests for testimony and discovery of documents may be "incompati-
ble" with German law if, for instance, they seek to discover "business
secrets." See, e.g., Heck, supra note 40, at 243 (citation omitted).
" Convention, supra note 2, art. 9.; see also Amram, supra note 67 at 654
(" 'Impossible' was deliberately used; it does not mean 'difficult' or
'inconvenient.'").
83 Convention, supra note 2, art. 23.
39 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 442 reporter's note 1 (1987) ("No aspect of the extension
of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United
States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in
investigation and litigation in the United States."); see also BORN & WESTIN,
supra note 4, at 261 (noting that "unilateral extraterritorial U.S. discovery
efforts have produced some of the most contentious disputes ... in
international civil litigation").
" Most Convention signatories have entered Article 23 declarations at
least partly limiting pre-trial discovery of documents.
s See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
I See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
,Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 563 n.21 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
4 Id.
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reservations to allow for a greater degree of document discov-
ery.
95
3. AiROSPATIALE
Prior to 1987, U.S. courts reached different conclusions
about the Hague Evidence Convention's role in U.S. civil and
commercial litigation.9" The United States Supreme Court
addressed this conflict in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle
Agrospatiale v. United States District Court.97 However,
while the Arospatiale Court unanimously agreed that the
Hague Evidence Convention provides neither the exclusive nor
mandatory means of taking evidence located in a signatory
nation, the arguments advanced in support of this conclusion
were somewhat flawed. Moreover, the Court was deeply
divided regarding the best method for determining when U.S.
courts should employ the Convention.
3.1. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens' opinion provided five arguments in support
of the conclusion that the Convention is not exclusive or
mandatory. First, Justice Stevens noted that the procedures
for taking evidence under the Convention are set forth using
discretionary rather than mandatory language. 8 In particu-
lar, Justice Stevens pointed to the Convention's preamble,
which states that the Convention is intended "to facilitate the
transmission" of evidence and "to improve mutual judicial co-
operation."9 In addition, Article 1 of the Convention indi-
cates that Contracting States "may" use the Letter of Request
method to obtain foreign evidence." Moreover, as Justice
"See, e.g., Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 564 n.22 (noting that France has
modified its reservation). Denmark will also now allow discovery of
documents requested with specificity. Id, Germany has also modified its
Article 23 reservation. Id.; see also Griffin & Bravin, supra note 31, at 345
n.101 (noting that "Germany [has] promulgated new regulations permitting
some pretrial discovery" of documents).
96 See supra note 7.
97 482 U.S. 522.
'a Id. at 534.
" Id.; see also Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
1'" Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 535 (citation omitted).
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Stevens noted, the Hague Service Convention'"' speaks in
mandatory terms. This nearly contemporaneous agreement
provided the Hague Evidence Convention's drafters with a
"model exclusivity provision" had they wished to make the
Convention exclusive or mandatory."°
Second, the majority viewed the right of signatory nations
to deny pretrial discovery under Article 23 as precluding the
possibility that the Convention could be exclusive or mandato-
ry.lOS
Third, Article 27 of the Convention,' 0 ' as interpreted by
the majority, "plainly" permits requesting nations to employ
their own traditional methods of discovery in place of the
Convention's procedures.'
Fourth, requiring exclusive use of the Convention would
result in some parties using the Convention while opponents
in the same litigation proceed with discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This, Justice Stevens wrote,
"create[s] three unacceptable asymmetries" which would place
U.S. litigants at an unfair advantage in relation to their
foreign opponents:
First, within any lawsuit between a national of the
United States and a national of another contracting
party, the foreign party could obtain discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while the domes-
tic party would be required to resort first to the proce-
1.. The Hague Service Convention states that the "Convention shall
apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters." Service Convention,
supra note 69, 20 U.S.T. at 362, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, U.N.T.S. at 165
(emphasis added).
... Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 534 n.15.
163 I& at 536-37.
'*' Article 27 provides:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a
Contracting State from - (a) declaring that Letters of Request may
be transmitted to its judicial authorities through channels other
than those provided for [in this Convention]; (b) permitting, by
internal law or practice, any act provided for in this Convention to
be performed upon less restrictive conditions; (c) permitting, by
internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than
those provided for in this Convention.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 27.
's Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 537-38."
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dures of the Hague Convention. This imbalance would
run counter to the fundamental maxim of discovery that
'[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation ....
Second, a rule of exclusivity would enable a compa-
ny which is a citizen of another contracting state to
compete with a domestic company on uneven terms,
since the foreign company would be subject to less
extensive discovery procedures in the that event both
companies were sued in an American court....
Third, since a rule of first use of the Hague Conven-
tion would apply to cases in which a foreign party is a
national of a contracting state, but not to cases in
which a foreign party is a national of any other foreign
state, the rule would confer an unwarranted advantage
on some domestic litigants over others similarly situat-
ed.1 6
Finally, the majority's fifth argument in support of its
conclusion that the Convention is not exclusive or mandatory
is that the interest of U.S. courts in a 'just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action,"1 "7 combined with
the cost and delay associated with the Convention's proce-
dures, requires that the Convention be used only in certain
circumstances.'O°
According to Justice Stevens, lower courts faced with
requests for evidence located abroad should engage in a
"particularized" comity analysis to determine whether resort
to the treaty is necessary."° A comity analysis is required,
Justice Stevens instructed, even if the court has personal
jurisdiction over the party from whom discovery is sought and
the evidence will be produced in the United States. If the
result of comity balancing favors use of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Convention need not be employed."'
'" I& at 540 n.25 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
'0 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
"Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542-43.
'"I& at 543-44.
'1 Under the majority opinion, a party asserting that evidence should be
taken under the Convention has the burden of proving that the Hague
Evidence Convention's procedures would be more effective than the Federal
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However, Justice Stevens was careful to emphasize that the
comity analysis should be conducted with extreme care so that
any direct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is not "abusive" and does not offend "any sovereign
interest expressed by a foreign state.' 11
3.2. Justice Blackmun's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, writing for the minority, concurred with
Justice Stevens' finding that the Hague Evidence Convention
does not provide the exclusive means for obtaining evidence
located abroad.1 " Unlike Justice Stevens and the majority,
however, Justice Blackmun did not believe a comity analysis
would give the Convention sufficient effect in U.S. litiga-
tion." ,  Accordingly, Justice Blackmun would generally
require "first resort" to the Convention, allowing for direct
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only
when the Convention's procedures "prove to be unhelpful" or
when resort to the Convention would clearly be futile."'
3.3. Critique of Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion
The Adrospatiale majority opinion is, at times, "loosely-
reasoned.""5 For instance, although Article 1 of the Conven-
tion states that contracting states "may" use the Letter of
Request to obtain evidence, this language was not necessarily
intended to indicate that the Convention is permissive in
nature, as the majority determined. Indeed, this "permissive"
language is equally susceptible to a different interpretation,
namely that among the methods for obtaining evidence under
the Convention, the Letter of Request is merely one of several
potential options. As one commentator has noted:
Rules of Civil Procedure in obtaining the needed evidence.
"I Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546. The Arospatiale majority cited
interrogatories as one example of so-called "non-intrusive" discovery
procedures. Id. at 545.
112 Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113 Id. According to Justice Blackmun, "there is a large risk that the
case-by-case comity analysis ... permitted by the Court will be performed
inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the Conven-
tion will be invoked infrequently." Id.
114 1d at 548-49.
I's BORN & WESTIN, supra note 4, at 331.
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[T]he Court reads too much into the use of the term
'may' in the Evidence Convention... [in] the chapter[s]
on letters of request and evidence taking by diplomatic
officers, consular agents, and commissioners....
Essentially the Court... read[s] the permissive 'may'
as negating the Convention's exclusive character. But
even if the Convention procedures were truly manda-
tory, the term 'may' would still be used to indicate what
courts and officers of signatory states are permitted to
do, or request be done, with respect to evidence located
in other signatory states.1 6
Nevertheless, language contained in the Evidence Convention's
preamble,"" compared with the language of the Service
Convention,"' supports the notion that the drafters intended
that the Convention not be viewed as providing the exclusive
or mandatory means of taking evidence located abroad.
The second basis for the majority's decision-that the plain
language of Article 27 permits nations to use their own, more
liberal procedures of discovery instead of the Convention-
clearly misinterprets the Convention. As Justice Blackmun
suggested in his separate opinion in Agrospatiale, Article 27 is
not designed to permit a requesting nation to use its own
procedures when seeking evidence located within another
signatory nation."' Rather, the purpose of Article 27 was to
indicate that a receiving nation is not precluded from permit-
ting the taking of evidence within its own territory by methods
not specified in the Convention.
The writings of Philip W. Amram, a member of the United
States delegation to the Hague Conference and the Reporter
for the Hague Evidence Convention, amply support this
interpretation of Article 27. Shortly after collaborating in the
drafting of the Convention, Mr. Amram wrote that "[i]f the
domestic law of the requested state is more beneficial and more
116 Bermann, supra note 29, at 531.
117 See supra note 72.
113 See supra note 101.
"I3 See Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 551 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The only logical interpretation of this Article
[27] is that a state receiving a discovery request may permit less restrictive
procedures than those designated in the Convention.") (emphasis added).
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flexible in favor of the foreign litigant than the Convention
techniques, those more liberal rules of the domestic law will
remain available to the foreign litigant and the requesting
authority."2 0 Mr. Amram also noted in an explanatory
report prepared prior to U.S. ratification of the Convention
that additional methods of taking evidence are permitted
under Article 27 of the Convention "if the internal law or
practice of the State of execution so permits."
121
The majority's contention that the Convention creates
certain asymmetries has merit. However, to combat these
asymmetries, U.S. courts can control discovery so that a party
required to seek evidence under the Convention will not be
disadvantaged."
The majority was also concerned that discovery under the
Convention will result in less than a "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."' This is not an
appropriate concern, however, because even if taking evidence
under the Convention results in a less efficient adjudication,
this is the price paid by the United States and its citizens for
the benefits provided by the Convention. Furthermore, the
Convention requires that receiving states shall respond
"expeditiously"' to a Letter of Request. Indeed, many
letters of request are apparently not as time-consuming or
US See Philip W. Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 107
(1973) (emphasis added).
1 EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 63, at 323. It may be asked why
the Convention's drafters would find it necessary to indicate that a receiving
state, in providing evidence to other signatory nations, is permitted to use
more liberal procedures than those set forth in the Convention. There are
two possible explanations: First, because the United States had recently
enacted a law permitting virtually unlimited access to evidence located in
this country, the drafters perhaps wanted to assure other nations that the
Convention did not eliminate use of these more liberal procedures. Second,
the Convention may have addressed this issue so that other countries, if
requested to liberalize their own internal procedures, would be unable to
respond that the Convention limits the available methods of taking evidence
located within signatory nations.
' See, e.g., Mrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 566 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (advocating management of discovery to prevent
unfair disadvantage to a party required to use the Convention).
12 See supra note 107-08 and accompanying text.
124 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 9.
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expensive to process as the Adrospatiale majority suggests.125
Perhaps the strongest argument advanced by the majority
in support of its conclusion that the Convention is not exclu-
sive or mandatory is that the Convention permits signatory
nations to shield documents from pre-trial discovery under
Article 23. The consequences of reading the Convention as
exclusive, and accepting that U.S. courts, in some cases, would
be completely forbidden from ordering production of documents
located abroad, would mean that foreign litigants could
immunize themselves from document discovery by storing
documents in foreign depositories. 26 It seems most unlikely
that U.S. representatives to the Hague Conference would have
accepted such a result. Therefore, on the basis of Article 23
alone, the result of the Court's interpretation appears wise, at
least from a U.S. perspective: the Evidence Convention should
not be viewed as providing the exclusive or mandatory means
of collecting evidence located within another signatory nation.
Unfortunately, the majority's particularized comity analysis
fails to provide lower courts with sufficient guidance regarding
when resort to the Convention is appropriate. Part of the
uS While theAirospatiale majority and subsequent lower court decisions
have cited the Evidence Convention's alleged additional cost and delay to
justify resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are no empirical
studies demonstrating that use of the Convention is, in fact, significantly
more costly or time-consuming. Indeed, as some commentators have noted,
the cost of using the Convention may be "minimal, and [the] compliance
burdens ... generally limited." See, e.g., David J. Gerber, International
Discovery After Arospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 545 (1988) (citations omitted). However, one practitio-
ner, Gary B. Born, states that barring litigation on the matter, a Letter of
Request may require three to six months to fulfill. See Gary B. Born &
Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-Arospatiale Applications
of the Hague Evidence Convention 24 INT'L LAW. 393, 398 n.24 (1990). Yet
even if the Letter of Request procedure is more time-consuming or costly,
the Convention in some cases also provides for the taking of evidence by
consuls or commissioners, which will often be more efficient than the Letter
of Request procedure.
.. See David E. Teitelbaum, Note, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial
Discovery, 38 STAN. L. REV. 841, 856 (1986) (noting that use of the
Convention is "particularly unfair when the nonproducing party has, in bad
faith, secreted information ... with the specific intent of frustrating the
litigation at hand"); see also Cooper Industries, Inc. v. British Aerospace,
102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that if such a construction were
adopted, even U.S. companies might be encouraged to establish overseas
subsidiaries for the purpose of storing documents).
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problem is that international comity can be an "amor-
phous" 7 concept. Mindful of this, Justice Stevens' opinion
goes to some length to provide courts with an explanation of
the comity principle and the factors involved in comity
balancing. The opinion describes comity as "the spirit of
cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the
resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other
sovereign states."' However, as some commentators have
noted, 2 " the opinion also defines comity according to the
factors suggested by the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law."' Elsewhere, the opinion mentions other consider-
ations"' and cites earlier descriptions of comity by the
Supreme Court3 2 and a description of comity formulated by
127BORN & WESTIN, supra note 4, at 3.
129 Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543 n.27.
12 See, e.g., BORN & WESTIN, supra note 4, at 330.
'" The Court said that a comity analysis may be guided by the following
factors:
(1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other
information requested;
(2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information;
and
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the state
where the information is located.
Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) § 437(1)(c) (Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1986) (approved May 14, 1986) (now RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES)).
131 See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 4, at 330 (citing the A&ospatiale
Court's references to "sovereign interests"; "likelihood that resort ... will
prove effective"; and "respective interests of the foreign nation and [the
United States]").
'" On one occasion, the U.S. Supreme Court defined comity as follows:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.
Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543 n.27 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163-64 (1895)).
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Ulrich Huber, a seventeenth-century Dutch jurist.'
Because of the majority's unwillingness to adopt a firm rule
indicating when resort to the Convention is necessary, lower
courts are left with the important and often politically
sensitive task of determining when to apply the Convention's
procedures. This is particularly troublesome because parties
may not always inform courts of the various interests that
must be considered if a complete and proper comity analysis
is to be conducted.'M Moreover, in many cases, lower court
decisions on discovery, based on the A~rospatiale majority's
highly malleable comity approach, will not be reviewed by an
appellate court."3 5
Because the outcome of the analysis may vary from court
to court, the Adrospatiale majority's balancing approach may
also encourage forum shopping. 3 ' Plaintiffs favoring use of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will likely attempt to
bring suit in forums where comity balancing in earlier cases
often resulted in resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.' On the other hand, if a case is brought in state
a Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber was cited by the Court for his description
of international comity:
By the courtesy of nations, whatever laws are carried into execu-
tion, within the limits of any government, are considered as having
the same effect every where, so far as they do not occasion a
prejudice to the rights of the other governments, or their citizens.
[N]othing would be more convenient in the promiscuous intercourse
and practice of mankind, than that what was valid by the laws of
one place, should be rendered of no effect elsewhere, by a diversity
of law.
A6rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543 n.27 (citations omitted).
13 See Weis, supra note 8, at 929 (citation omitted). Moreover, Judge
Weis notes that "[t]he substantial volume of... transnational [litigation]
makes it unrealistic to expect the affected government agencies to have
actual knowledge ... that treaty obligations are at stake in a particular
case." Id.
1" See Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 527 (citations omitted) (recognizing that
"immediate appellate review of an interlocutory discovery order is not
ordinarily available"); see also Weis, supra note 8, at 928 (noting "that most
of the rulings on discovery will never come to the attention of the courts of
appeals [because such] rulings are almost always interlocutory and the
discretion now entrusted to the district judge make those orders unlikely
candidates for mandamus in most instances.") (citation omitted).
1' Martikan, supr'a note 30, at 1019 (citation omitted) (contending that
the "unpredictability [of the comity analysis] encourages forum shopping").
. 137 Id.
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court, defendants seeking to use the Convention will seek to
remove to a federal district court where comity balancing has
often favored use of the Convention." 8 In light of the desire
for procedural uniformity among federal courts, the possibility
of differences in procedure based on choice of forum is unsatis-
factory.12 9
4. AMENDING RULE 26(A)
4.1. The Effort to Amend Rule 26(a)
Presently, the general discovery provision of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is silent regarding the proper role of
the Hague Evidence Convention in U.S. civil procedure."
However, shortly after the Agrospatiale decision, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules' began drafting a pro-
posed amendment to Rule 26(a) to provide U.S. courts with
guidance in determining whether to apply the Convention or
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when evidence is located
within another signatory nation."
M Id.
1" Post-Agrospatiale cases are instructive. Predictably, comity balancing
has often resulted in resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
e.g., Doster v. Schenk, A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50 (M.D.N.C. 1991); Roberts v.
Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Anschuetz & Co. GmbH, 838
F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1988) (expressing dissatisfaction with the A6rospatiale
comity balancing approach); Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386
(D.N.J. 1987). However, one court, applying the prescribed comity balancing
analysis, has required that discovery initially proceed under the Hague
Evidence Convention. See In re Perrier Bottled Water Litigation, 138 F.R.D.
348 (D. Conn. 1991).
Interestingly, at least one court arguably rejected comity balancing in
favor of Justice Blackmun's first resort rule and ordered that discovery take
place under the Convention. See Hudson v. Herman Pfauter GmbH & Co.,
117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
14 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
141 For a discussion on the rule-making process and the role of the
Advisory Committee, see WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING:
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (Federal Judicial Center 1981); Joseph F.
Spaniol, Jr., Making Federal Rules: The Inside Story, 69 A.B.A. J. 1645
(1983).
" See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Meeting of November
19-20, 1987 (on file at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
[hereinafter "AO"]).
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4.2. Tentative Draft of Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(a)
One of the Advisory Committee's earliest attempts at
developing an amendment to Rule 26(a) produced a tentative
draft that would have largely adopted the reasoning of Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Agrospatiale. The draft provided:
If an applicable treaty or convention provides for
discovery in another country, the discovery methods
agreed to in such treaty or convention shall be em-
ployed; but if such methods afford discovery that is less
effective than the discovery afforded under these rules,
and additional discovery is not prohibited by the treaty
or convention, a party may fully employ the methods
here provided in addition to those provided by such
convention or *treaty."
In addition to its command that the Convention "shall be
employed," the amendment's use of the terms "less effective"
and "additional," read together, indicate that discovery should
occur under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the
Evidence Convention's procedures have been employed and
have failed to produce the needed evidence because the
Convention, in that particular situation, was "inadequate."
The Committee Note accompanying the tentative draft of
the amendment provided:
[This amendment] reflects the policy of comity ex-
pressed in [Justice Blackmun's] concurring opinion in
In re SocidtM Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, [482]
U.S. [522], [547] (1987).
International litigants should not be placed in a
favored position as compared to American litigants
similarly situated, especially in commercial matters
with respect to which the similar American litigants
may be their economic competitors. For this reason,
full discovery should be available equally against all
who litigate in the federal courts.
'" See Rule 26, General Provisions Concerning Discovery, Amendments
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Reporter's Drafts Under Consideration
by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Nov., 1987, For Inclusion in
Proposals Tentatively Scheduled to be Published for Comment in 1989
[hereinafter Reporter's Drafts] (on file at AO) (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, if certain methods of discovery
have been approved for international use, positive
international relations require that these methods be
preferred, and that other methods should be employed
only if the approved methods are inadequate to meet
the need of the litigant for the information.'
By indicating that the Evidence Convention should be the
strongly preferred means of obtaining evidence located abroad,
and permitting resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
only when the Convention is employed, but proves to be
"inadequate," the Committee Note demonstrated that the
Advisory Committee wished to incorporate Justice Blackmun's
"first resort" approach into Rule 26(a).
4.3. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(a)
In the Fall of 1989, a Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain-
ing an amendment to Rule 26(a) was released for public
comment.'" The proposed amendment differed in one im-
portant respect from the reporter's tentative draft' formu-
lated several years earlier. While both versions of the amend-
ment indicated that the procedures in a treaty or Convention
"shall be employed," the proposed rule released for public
comment stated that "if discovery conducted [under the
Convention] is inadequate or inequitable and additional
discovery is not prohibited by the treaty or convention, a party
may employ the methods provided in addition to those
provided by such convention or treaty."47 Under the earlier,
tentative draft, resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
4 &L (Committee Note) (emphasis added).
'"The Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Amendment provided:
If an applicable treaty or convention provides for discovery in
another country, the discovery methods agreed to in such treaty or
convention shall be employed; but if discovery conducted by such
methods is inadequate or inequitable and additional discovery is not
prohibited by the treaty or convention, a party may employ the
methods here provided in addition to those provided by such
convention or treaty.
Preliminary Draft, 127 F.R.D. at 318.
'"See Reporter's Drafts, supra note 143.
147 See Preliminary Draft, 127 F.R.D. at 318 (emphasis added).
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had been permitted when discovery under the Convention had
proven to be "less effective."1
The change in language from "less effective" to "inadequate
or inequitable" signals a shift by the Advisory Committee away
from some of the reasoning contained in Justice Blackmun's
opinion. The term "inequitable," on its face, suggests that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be used, without
resorting to the Convention, when the Convention may result
in unfair disadvantage to a party. Indeed, the Advisory
Committee Note14 to the proposed rule provides that "[i]nter-
national litigants should not be placed in a favored position as
compared to U.S. litigants similarly situated, especially in
commercial matters with respect to which similar U.S.
litigants may be their economic competitors. Especially, an
international litigant using the provisions of Rule[s] 26-37
should not be permitted to use the Hague [Evidence] Conven-
14 See Reporter's Drafts, supra note 143.
"' The Advisory Committee Note provided:
Language is added. ... to reflect the policy of accommodation to
internationally agreed methods of discovery expressed in the
concurring opinion in In re Socit6 Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale, [107 S. Ct.] 2542, 2557-2568 (1987). Attorneys and
judges should be cognizant of the adverse consequence for interna-
tional relations of unduly intrusive discovery methods that offend
the sensibilities of those governing other countries. If certain
methods of discovery have been approved for international use,
positive international relations require that these methods be
preferred, and that other methods should not be employed if the
approved methods are adequate to meet the need of the litigant for
timely access to the information.
On the other hand, the language added to the rule also requires
that discovery proceed in a manner that is not 'inequitable.'
International litigants should not be placed in a favored position as
compared to American litigants similarly situated, especially in
commercial matters with respect to which the similar American
litigants may be their economic competitors. Especially, an
international litigant using the provisions of Rule[s] 26-37 should
not be permitted to use the Hague [Evidence] Convention or a
similar international agreement to create obstacles to discovery by
an adversary. In general, full discovery should be available equally
against all who litigate in the federal courts. Where the impedi-
ment to discovery is imposed by public authority not at the request
of the international litigant, accommodation may be necessary to
reconcile the requirement of this rule that discovery be equitable to
the obligations imposed by the treaty.
Preliminary Draft, 127 F.R.D. at 320-21 (citation omitted).
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tion or a similar international agreement to create obstacles to
discovery by an adversary."
150
Though there is the possibility that foreign litigants with
extensive U.S. operations may store documents abroad or take
other measures in a deliberate attempt to impede discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice
Blackmun's solution when one party is disadvantaged by the
Convention is to have the court manage discovery to prevent
such disadvantage from occurring."" Indeed, it was partly
because of the possibility of disadvantaging some litigants that
Justice Stevens, writing for theAdrospatiale majority, instruct-
ed courts to apply a comity analysis on a case-by-case ba-
sis.' If the drafters intended to be faithful to Justice
Blackmun's first resort approach, inclusion of an "inequitable"
exception to discovery under the Convention is unfortunate.
4.3.1. Public Response
Reaction to the preliminary draft of the proposed amend-
ment was divided. A number of practitioners' and foreign
governments'TM applauded the Advisory Committee's decision
15 Id
151 SeeAgrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 565-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
152 See id. at 543-44 (Stevens, J.).
13See, e.g., Letter from Charles Platto, Chairman, International
Litigation Committee, to James E. Macklin, Jr., Secretary, Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States (Mar. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Platto Letter] (on file at AO) (stating
that "the members of the International Litigation Committee [of the
International Bar Association] respectfully offer their support for the
proposed Rule 26, which would give greater effect to the Evidence Conven-
tion's procedures for obtaining evidence abroad").
The Philadelphia Bar Association also recommended adoption of the
preliminary draft of the proposed amendment. See Letter from Bonnie
Brigance Leadbetter, Chair, Federal Courts Committee of the Philadelphia
Bar Association, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (Mar. 13, 1990) (on file at AO).
15 For example, the British government, in a communication from its
Embassy, expressed its belief that the preliminary draft of the proposed
amendment to Rule 26 moved the United States in line with prevailing
views of the Hague Evidence Convention's proper role in modern interna-
tional litigation.
The British Government welcome[s] the addition of language to
proposed rule 26(a) ... to reflect the policy of accommodation to
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to move away from Justice Stevens' opinion. Others argued
that the Advisory Committee should not set aside the major-
ity's comity balancing approach.' 5. Moreover, if a new rule
were enacted to overrule theAdrospatiale Court's holding, such
a rule must come from Congress, not the Advisory Committee.15
internationally agreed methods of discovery. We suggest however
that consideration be given to strengthening the language ... by
making clear that agreed methods of discovery should not be set
aside without the most careful consideration.
Letter from Edmund Hosker, First Secretary (Trade Policy), British
Embassy, Commercial Department, to The Judicial Conference of the United
States (Aug. 21, 1990).(on file at AO).
15 See, e.g., Statement of Thomas L. Riesenberg, Assistant General
Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
Before the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Chicago, Ill. (Feb. 2, 1990) (stating that the
"proposal departs from existing law... It is surprising that this Commit-
tee would.., give effect to the treaty in a fashion which, according to the
Supreme Court, was not intended by the treaty's authors.").
See also Letter from Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, Civil Division, to the Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 15, 1990)
(claiming that the "'first use' policy requiring exhaustion of the procedures
of the Hague Evidence Convention does not take into account ... the
Supreme Court's decision in ... A4rospatiale [and] create[s] a double
standard [giving the foreign litigant an unfair advantage over their domestic
counterpart in conducting] discovery under the existing rules").
See also Memorandum, Hague Evidence Convention: Proposed
Amendment to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from
Lawrence Collins, Esq., Herbert Smith, to Charles Platto, Esq., Cahill
Gordon & Reindel (Apr. 2, 1990) (contending that "the proposed amendment
... is not only unnecessary, but would [create] a charter for foreign based
defendants to delay and impede meritorious litigation by United States
plaintiffs. There is no reason in principle why discovery as between the
parties should not take place in the United States according to United
States procedure."). Mr. Collins also renewed his argument that the
Convention applies only to "evidence" and not pre-trial discovery ("The
Hague Evidence Convention was intended to apply to the taking of evidence,
in the sense of material required to prove or disprove allegations at trial.
It was not intended to apply to discovery in the sense of the search for
material which might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and there
is no reason at all to believe it was intended to apply to discovery between
the parties.... The main purpose of the Convention is to allow the parties
to litigation to obtain oral and documentary evidence from third parties.")
(emphasis in original).
'" See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1456, 1495 (1991) (reviewing GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATION-
AL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY &
MATERIALS (1989)). Professor Burbank contends that "[o]nce the Supreme
Court has authoritatively interpreted a treaty, the matter is for Congress
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Although the majority of the comments primarily focused
on whether to adopt the proposed amendment, several
comments offered suggestions relating to other aspects of the
proposal. One comment suggested that the proposed amend-
ment should reflect the Agrospatiale Court's holding that the
Convention is applicable regardless of whether the needed
evidence will be taken in a signatory nation, or from a
signatory nation, to be produced at trial in the United
States.""7 Including such language in the rule would require
first resort to an applicable treaty "when documents or
deponents are being brought from abroad, and not just when
they are being examined there."l "8 Although it was unclear
from the proposed amendment and accompanying Note, the
Advisory Committee had already rejected this position. 59
The public comments also expressed concern about the
meaning of "inadequate" as used in the proposed amend-
ment.'o In particular, it was suggested that a change
should be made to the Notes "specifying that a 'partial Article
23 reservation' to the Hague Evidence Convention should not
deny presumptive adequacy of the Convention['s] methods,
whereas a blanket Article 23 reservation should be regarded
as making the Convention presumptively inadequate."'"'
and the President." Id.
Some commentators, however, contend that the rule-making process can
be used to enact Justice Blackmun's first resort rule. These commentators
assert that an amendment by the Advisory Committee to Rule 26 giving
greater effect to the Convention would not overrule the Arospatiale Court
because the Court interpreted the Convention in light of the "then-existing"
Rule 26, not the amended Rule 26. See Letter from Edwin R. Alley, Esq.,
Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, to James E. Macklin, Jr., Secretary,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States (Mar. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Alley Letter]; see also Platto
Letter, supra note 154.
1' See Rule 26, General Provisions GoverningDiscovery, Reporter's Draft
Not Intended for Public Comment (Mar. 15, 1990) [hereinafter Reporter's
Draft] (on file at AO) (noting that "Mr. Born proposes that 'from' be
substituted for 'in'").
' 8 Id.
15 See id. (stating that "[ilt is the Reporter's impression that it was the
situations involving depositions and production of documents abroad that
the first-resort provision was intended to reach").
l Id. (noting "Mr. Born is troubled by the meaning of 'inadequate').
161 Id.
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4.3.2. Additional Revisions
In March of 1990, approximately six months after releasing
the proposed rule for public comment, the Advisory Committee
was still refining the amendment. A draft conceived at this
time provided:
If a party seeks to obtain discovery at a place within a
country having a treaty with the United States applica-
ble to the securing of evidence abroad, the party shall
proceed in conformity with the treaty or by leave of
court upon a showing that the internationally agreed
methods are inadequate or inequitable.'
This draft of the amendment differed in several important
respects from the proposal which had been published for public
comment. First, in response to an earlier public comment, the
Advisory Committee Note"a provided courts with guidance
ia Id
16 The Advisory Committee Note provided:
Language is added.., to reflect the policy of accommodation to
internationally agreed methods of discovery expressed in the
concurring opinion in In re Socigti Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale, [107 S. Ct.] 2542-2568 (1987). Attorneys and judges
should be cognizant of the adverse consequence for international
relations of unduly intrusive discovery methods that offend the
sensibilities of those governing other countries. If certain methods
of discovery have been approved for international use, positive
international relations require that these methods be preferred, and
that other methods should not be employed if the approved methods
are adequate to meet the need of the litigant for timely access to
the information.
The rule does not require comity where the internationally
agreed means is 'inadequate.' This allows the court to make a
discreet judgment on the facts as to the sufficiency of those means.
Illustratively, a party should be required to make first resort under
the Hague Convention despite a partial Article 23 reservation by
the countryin which discovery is sought, but not if that country has
imposed a blanket reservation as an obstacle to discovery.
The language added also requires that discovery proceed in a
manner that is not 'inequitable.' International litigants should not
be placed in a favored position as compared to American litigants
similarly situated, especially in commercial matters with respect to
which the similar American litigants may be their economic
competitors. Especially, an international litigant using the
provisions of Rule[s] 26-37 should not be permitted to use the
Hague [Evidence] Convention or a similar international agreement
to create obstacles to discovery by an adversary. In general, full
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on whether the Convention is "inadequate" by noting that
"[i]llustratively, a party should be required to make first re ort
under the Hague Convention despite a partial Article 23
reservation by the country in which discovery is sought, but
not if that country has imposed a blanket reservation as an
obstacle to discovery." 6
The draft also indicated that the first resort rule would
apply only when discovery will occur "at a place within [a
signatory nation] having a treaty ... applicable to the
securing of evidence abroad."1 " As the Advisory Committee
Note indicated, "[t]he rule of comity stated in this rule does
not apply to discovery of documents and things from parties
who are subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, and who
may be required to produce such materials at the place of
trial."1 "
The Note thus confirms that the Advisory Committee
wished to set aside that part of the Agrospatiale decision that
had made the Evidence Convention applicable when a court
has jurisdiction over a party and the needed evidence, though
located abroad, will be produced in the United States. In
support of this change, the Advisory Committee Note cited
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxite.1"
However, the Bauxite case is probably better known for
holding that U.S. courts may compel discovery for the purpose
of determining whether individuals or entities are subject to
their jurisdiction. Under Bauxite, once jurisdiction is estab-
discovery should be available equally against all who litigate in the
federal courts. Where the impediment to discovery is imposed by
public authority not at the request of the international litigant,
accommodation may be necessary to reconcile the requirement of
this rule that discovery be equitable to the obligations imposed by
the treaty.
The rule of comity stated in this rule does not apply to
discovery of documents and things from parties who are subject to
the court's personal jurisdiction, and who may be required to
produce such materials at the place of trial. E.g., Insurance Corp.
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
Reporter's Draft, supra note 157 (citation omitted).
164 Id.
16,6 Id.
I"ld. (citing Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456
U.S. 694 (1982)).
167 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
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lished, U.S. courts have the power. to compel the production of
evidence located abroad. However, the Bauxite Court did not
consider whether the exercise of this power is proper in light
of the Hague Evidence Convention or another international
agreement governing discovery of evidence located abroad.
Conversely, the Agrospatiale Court clearly held that in some
cases U.S. courts should refrain from exercising their power to
order evidence under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
instead take evidence under the Convention.
4.4. The Proposed Amendment
In the summer of 1990, the proposed amendment to
Rule 26(a) was again revised.1 The newly revised amend-
ment provided: "Discovery at a place within a country having
a treaty with the United States applicable to such discovery
shall be conducted by methods authorized by the treaty unless
the court determines that those methods are inadequate or
inequitable and authorizes other discovery methods not
prohibited by the treaty."1 This version of the amendment
and the accompanying Advisory Committee Note were for-
warded to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure with the recommendation that "the Supreme Court
of the United States be advised to promulgate" the newly
revised Rule 26.170 The Advisory Committee Note to the
amendment provided:
Language is added.., to reflect a policy of balanced
accommodation to international agreements bearing on
methods of discovery. Cf Socitd Nationale v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., S.D. Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2557-2568 (1987).
Attorneys and judges should be cognizant of the adverse
consequence for international relations of unduly
intrusive discovery methods that offend the sensibilities
'" The change in language was authorized at a meeting of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, June 6-8, 1990. See Minutes of Civil Rules
Committee Meeting, in New York City (June 6-8, 1990) (on file at AO).
'" Proposed Amendments, 134 F.R.D. at 641.
'"Memorandum from John F. Grady, Chair, Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, to the Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chair, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 19, 1990) (on file at
AO).
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of those governing other countries. If certain methods
of discovery have been approved for international use,
positive international relations require that these
methods be preferred, and that other methods should
not be employed in discovery at places in foreign
countries, at least if the approved methods are ade-
quate to meet the need of the litigant for timely access
to the information.
The rule of comity stated in this rule does not apply
to discovery of documents and things from parties who
are subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, and who
may be required to produce such materials at the place
of trial. E.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). The rule also does
not apply to the taking of depositions of parties or
persons controlled by parties who may be deposed
within the United States. However, comity may be
employed in matters to which the requirement of the
rule does not apply. Cf. Socidt6 Nationale v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., S.D. Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2543 (1987).
Nor does the rule require comity where the discov-
ery methods available by treaty are 'inadequate or
inequitable.' This provision allows the court to make a
discreet judgment on the facts as to the sufficiency of
the internationally agreed discovery methods. Illustra-
tively, a party should be required to make first resort
under the Hague Convention despite a partial Article
23 reservation by the country in which discovery is
sought, but not if that country has imposed a blanket
reservation as an obstacle to discovery.
The rule also directs the court to authorize the use
of other discovery methods as may be needed to assure
that discovery is not 'inequitable.' International
litigants should not be placed in a favored position as
compared to U.S. litigants similarly situated, especially
in commercial matters with respect to which the similar
U.S. litigants may be their economic competitors.
Especially, an international litigant using the provi-
sions of Rule[s] 26-37 should not be permitted to use
the Hague Evidence Convention or a similar interna-
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tional agreement or even the law of the party's own
country to create obstacles to equivalent discovery by
an adversary.
Indeed, the court is not precluded by the rule from
authorizing, to assure that discovery is adequate and
equitable, the use of discovery methods that may
violate the laws of another country. Cf Societe Inter-
nationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). Where the
impediment to discovery is imposed by public authority
not at the request of the international litigant or the
non-party from whom information is sought, accommo-
dation may be necessary to reconcile the requirement of
this rule that discovery be equitable to foreign law. But
in no circumstance can the court authorize discovery
methods that violate the mandate of a treaty that is the
law of the United States.171
This Advisory Committee Note expanded on previous Notes
by addressing the question whether foreign blocking statutes
prevent discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In support of the proposition that such statutes do not
automatically bar discovery, the Note cited Societe Nationale
v. Rogers."2 As some commentators have noted, however,
the Advisory Committee Note's language is so broad that it
could also be interpreted as authorizing violations of other
internal laws of signatory nations, even if such violations occur
within the signatory's territory.17 3  Clearly, such an action
should not be undertaken lightly.
4.4.1. Public Response
Public reaction to the amendment in its new form reflected
several concerns. In particular, the determination that the
amendment would apply only to discovery "at a place within a
country having a treaty.., applicable to such discovery," led
to criticism of the Advisory Committee for departing from the,
"" Proposed Amendments, 134 F.R.D. at 642-43 (citation omitted).
'72 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
178 See, eg., Born, supra note 37.
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judgment of the Adrospatiale Court.1"' There was also
concern expressed about the Advisory Committee Note, which
appeared to authorize discovery on foreign territory even when
such discovery would violate the internal law of the nation in
which the needed evidence is sought." In addition, accord-
ing to some practitioners, the proposed amendment, unlike the
preliminary draft, permitted comity balancing instead of first
resort to the treaty.L7 6 In late 1991, however, the proposed
amendment was returned by the United States Supreme Court
to the Advisory Committee for further study, 7
4.5. Proposal: Modify and Enact the "First Resort" Rule
The Advisory Committee's effort to amend the general
discovery provision to address foreign discovery is commend-
able. The choice between the Hague Evidence Convention and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the context of discovery
abroad is largely a choice between two different procedural
methods. The proper method for making such a choice should
be included in Rule 26(a).
The principal advantage to Justice Stevens' comity analysis
17 See, e.g., Letter from Adair Dyer, First Secretary, Hague Conference
on Private International Law, to Edwin R. Alley, Esq., Carpenter, Bennett
& Morrissey (Aug. 29, 1990) (on file at AO) (stating that he was "troubled
by... changes made from the Committee's earlier draft [because the revised
proposed amendment] appears to reverse the unanimous decision of the nine
[Justices] in the Airospatiale case" that the Hague Evidence Convention
may apply when discovery is sought from a party subject to a U.S. court's
jurisdiction and the needed evidence, though located abroad, will be
produced in the United States).
17r See id.; see also Burbank, supra note 156, at 1495 (suggesting that the
Advisory Committee is "out of [its] depth when dealing with international
civil procedure").
17' Some practitioners and government agencies preferred the proposed
amendment for precisely this reason. See, e.g., Thomas Riesenberg &
Joseph Franco, The (New) Discovery of America: New Procedures Cause a
Ripple, Not a Wave, LEGAL TIMES, Week of Apr. 8, 1991, at 32 (stating that
the newly revised "draft of Rule 26(a) is a major improvement over the
[earlier] proposal [because] it would be inappropriate to use the Federal
Rules amendment process to overturn a Supreme Court precedent on a
question of treaty interpretation, particularly where that precedent reflects
a position urged upon the Court by the executive branch [in an amicus
brief]") (Mr. Riesenberg and Mr. Franco are attorneys in the General
Counsel's Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
'7 Telephone interview with Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Secretary, Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts (Dec. 31, 1991).
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is that in some situations resort to the Convention may be
more time-consuming or expensive than seeking evidence
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally,
some might argue that there are simply cases in which the
amount of interference with the judicial sovereignty of a
signatory nation by proceeding under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is so minimal as to make resort to the
Convention unnecessary 78
However, the disadvantages of a comity analysis are
significant. Lower courts, often unfamiliar with other nations'
concerns and interests, will be called upon to make sensitive
decisions with possible international ramifications. In
addition, litigants may be unable to determine in advance
whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Hague
Evidence Convention will govern the evidence collecting
process. Moreover, certain courts may develop strong biases
toward one method of collecting evidence, resulting in forum
shopping and improper administration of the Convention or
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 9
Despite these flaws, the Agrospatiale Court adopted the
comity balancing approach. Nevertheless, as the Advisory
Committee recognized when it first began drafting an amend-
ment to Rule 26(a), the presumptive first resort rule proposed
by Justice Blackmun may provide the better approach to
discovery abroad. Under this approach, financial and judicial
resources are saved because parties generally need not make
arguments concerning the applicability of the Convention, and
judges need not engage in "wasteful" comity balancing."s
The first resort approach also provides predictability by
178 Indeed, this possibility was advanced by the Agrospatiale majority,
which suggested that less "intrusive" discovery methods such as interrogato-
ries may not require resort to the Convention. See AMrospatiale, 482 U.S.
at 545.
Applying somewhat similar reasoning, at least one commentator has
suggested completely exempting tort cases and "[slimple commercial
contract disputes" from the first resort rule because of the likelihood that
discovery in such cases will frequently be less extensive and less intrusive.
See Martikan, supra note 30, at 1025-26. However, although the Evidence
Convention is ambiguous in several respects, it clearly applies to tort and
commercial cases.
173 See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
1" See Platto Letter, supra note 153 (describing case-by-case comity
balancing as "wasteful"); see also Alley Letter, supra note 156.
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establishing that the Convention's procedures will normally be
employed in collecting evidence abroad; yet the first resort rule
still preserves the ability of litigants in certain situations to
take evidence under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, by giving greater effect to the Convention, the first
resort rule demonstrates that the United States remains
interested in fostering increased international judicial
cooperation, which may lead other nations to accede to the
Hague Evidence Convention and other international agree-
ments.
4.5.1. Modifications to the 'First Resort"Rule
Justice Blackmun's first resort rule is in some respects,
however, incomplete. For instance, the first resort rule does
not adequately protect against the possible extra cost and
delay of using the Evidence Convention. Moreover, a party
seeking discovery may be unfairly disadvantaged by resort to
the Evidence Convention if an opponent is simultaneously
permitted discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
The Advisory Committee was cognizant of these flaws and
attempted to. correct them, partly by indicating that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be used if discovery
under the Evidence Convention is "inadequate" or "inequita-
ble.""' However, these terms are too open to interpretation.
For this reason, the Committee might be well advised, if it
continues its effort to amend Rule 26(a), 2 to instead employ
different language in the rule and to use the Advisory Commit-
tee Note to delineate several specific situations in which use
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in seeking foreign
evidence is proper.
The new proposed amendment to Rule 26(a) should clearly
indicate that it is adopting the reasoning of Justice
Blackmun's separate opinion in Adrospatiale. The rule should
also state that it is applicable both when evidence is sought in
a signatory nation, and from a signatory nation. Additionally,
181 See Preliminary Draft, 127 F.R.D. at 318.
''At least one commentator, however, believes that the Advisory
Committee may not amend Rule 26 to incorporate Justice Blackmun's first
resort rule. See Burbank, supra note 156, at 1495.
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the rule should emphasize that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may be used only after the Convention's procedures
have been exhausted without success or when the Convention
clearly would fail to produce the needed evidence. Such a rule
might provide:
When evidence is sought from or in a signatory nation
to an applicable Convention, the methods of discovery
provided by such a Convention shall first be used in
seeking the needed evidence. If, however, the Conven-
tion's procedures are employed but fail to produce the
needed evidence, discovery may proceed under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, it is not
necessary to use the applicable Convention when first
resort to such a Convention would clearly fail to
produce the needed evidence.
4.5.2. The Advisory Committee Note
The Advisory Committee Note to this rule should reiterate
that an applicable Convention or treaty should normally be
used in seeking evidence located abroad before resorting to
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Committee Note should also re-emphasize that the first resort
rule applies regardless of whether the evidence will be taken
in or from another signatory nation. Moreover, the Committee
Note should clearly describe the limited circumstances in
which resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper.
Illustrations should be included in the Advisory Committee
Note to assist litigants and courts in correctly applying the
rule. Such an Advisory Committee Note might provide:
First Resort Rule Applicable Whether Evidence Is
Sought In or From a Signatory Nation: This rule is
intended to clarify the role of the Hague Evidence
Convention, and other Conventions and treaties, in U.S.
civil procedure. Ordinarily, the taking of evidence in
U.S. courts proceeds under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, unless explicitly indicated other-
wise by a Convention or this rule, an applicable Con-
vention will supplant the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as the appropriate method of obtaining evidence
from or in another signatory nation. For example, a
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Convention will be the first approach to obtaining
discovery both when a deposition is conducted in a
foreign nation's territory and when seeking specific
documents from within a foreign nation for use in the
United States.
Exceptions: When Evidence May Be Taken In or
From a Signatory Nation Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Under this rule, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may be used to take discovery in or
from a foreign nation in the following two situations:
(1) when the Convention has already been employed
and failed to produce the needed evidence. Illustrative-
ly, if a request for evidence is not fulfilled because the
authority responsible for obtaining the evidence was
unable to do so, discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is permitted. However, discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not permitted in
a foreign nation if it will violate the internal laws of
that nation. Alternatively, where the evidence is to be
taken from a signatory nation, courts may order that
such evidence be produced in the United States, even if
such an act would violate the signatory nation's inter-
nal laws, see Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197 (1958), provided that the Convention's procedures
have been exhausted without successfully obtaining the
needed evidence and that such additional procedures do
not violate the Convention.
(2) when it is clear that use of the Convention's
procedures will fail to produce the required evidence.
Illustratively, if a signatory nation has made a declara-
tion under Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention
that it will not respond to any requests for discovery of
documents and has not either formally or informally
modified this declaration, resort to the Convention is
unnecessary and discovery may proceed under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If, however, the
signatory nation has made a declaration only partly
limiting document discovery under the Convention, the
Convention's procedures shall be employed in an effort
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to obtain the needed documents. Should such proce-
dures fail to produce the needed documents, discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be
proper provided that the taking of such evidence in a
signatory nation does not violate the internal laws of
that country.
In the event a signatory nation refuses to respond to
a request for discovery under the Convention for
reasons not authorized by the Convention, discovery
may proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
subject to the limitation that discovery in a foreign
nation may not violate the internal laws of that nation.
Judicial Management of Discovery In or From a
Signatory Nation: Although this rule requires that
parties generally first resort to an applicable Conven-
tion when seeking evidence in or from a signatory
nation, courts must manage discovery so that parties
required to use the Convention are not unfairly disad-
vantaged. Thus, for example, a court may grant an
unfairly disadvantaged party additional time in which
to conduct discovery, or the court may delay discovery
of a party proceeding under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, if justice so requires.
This amendment to Rule 26(a) and the accompanying
Advisory Committee Note would have the effect of largely
implementing Justice Blackmun's opinion in Agrospatiale.
Courts, litigants, and foreign nations will know prior to
litigation that the Evidence Convention's procedures will
generally be used to obtain evidence located abroad.
The amendment requires that discovery proceed under the
Convention regardless of where the evidence will be produced,
even when the party from whom evidence is sought is subject
to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court. The amendment also
contemplates that the taking of evidence located within a
signatory nation for the purposes of 'jurisdictional" discovery
will normally occur under the Evidence Convention. Judicial
management of discovery can be used to prevent discovery
abuses and unfair disadvantage to a party required to use the
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Evidence Convention."'
4.5.3. The Residual Exception
There is, however, at least one important issue that this
proposal has thus far failed to address: whether the Hague
Evidence Convention should apply even when its procedures
are significantly more time-consuming or costly than the
methods of discovery available under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. If litigants will be severely injured by resort
to the Evidence Convention because of additional cost or delay,
U.S. courts should have some discretion to instead proceed
with discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(a) could address
these situations as follows:
Residual Exception Under Which the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure May Be Used To Obtain Evidence
Located Abroad: Where the need for evidence is
immediate, and failure to obtain the evidence in a
timely manner would result in severe hardship to a
party, courts should clearly indicate to the nation in
which the needed evidence is located that the request
must be fulfilled "expeditiously." If, despite indicating
that the request for evidence should be expedited, the
request is not fulifiled in this manner, courts may, in
appropriate circumstances, proceed with discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although there are no firm guidelines to assist
courts in determining when discovery requests are not
expeditiously handled or when the failure to obtain
evidence would result in severe hardship to a party,
'u For example, courts can prevent some discovery abuses by issuing
protective orders under Rule 26(c), which states that 'the court in the
district where [a] deposition is to be taken may... protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including... : (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may
be had only on specified terms and conditions, including... designation of
the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; ... (7)
that a trade secret or other confidential ... information not be disclosed or
be disclosed only in a designated way." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (emphasis
added).
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courts may in their discretion proceed under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if there is a strong,
demonstrated need to do so.
Because of the general need to use the Convention
whenever possible, the court shall exercise extreme
caution in determining that severe hardship will result
from the failure to immediately obtain the needed
evidence, and that it is, thus, necessary to proceed with
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Residual Exception will permit U.S. courts to use the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in circumstances where a
request for discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention
has been made, but where discovery is proceeding in an
unacceptable fashion and the delay or additional expense will
result in severe hardship to a party. Courts will no doubt
differ in determining whether the need for evidence is "imme-
diate" and whether the receiving nation has failed to respond
in an "expeditious" manner. Moreover, courts may also differ
regarding whether a party will experience "severe hardship" if
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not employed.
However, the tenor of the Advisory Committee Note proposed
here provides notice that a court shall carefully consider these
factors, along with the need to use the Convention whenever
possible, before permitting discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
5. CONCLUSION
Although the Adrospatiale Court adopted a comity balanc-
ing approach to guide lower courts in determining when to
apply the Hague Evidence Convention in U.S. civil and
commercial litigation, this Comment proposes largely incorpo-
rating Justice Blackmun's presumptive first resort approach
into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Modifications can
be made to Justice Blackmun's approach to ensure that first
resort to an applicable Convention or treaty will not signifi-
cantly disadvantage litigants in relation to their opponents or
in their efforts to secure evidence located abroad. While some
efficiency in the form of additional cost or delay may be
sacrificed in certain cases by giving the Convention greater
effect in U.S. civil procedure, the benefit of such a rule will be
procedural uniformity and, it is hoped, increased judicial
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cooperation between the United States and other present and
future signatory nations to the Hague Evidence Convention
and other international agreements.
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